

# Experience with machine protection system at J-PARC

N. Hayashi October 11, 2022 ESS - J-PARC commissioning workshop



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- MPS performance
- A few samples of MPS failure
- Summary

- MPS: Machine Protection System
- PPS: Personnel Protection System



#### **MPS overview**



#### **MPS overview**

- MPS network
  - In Linac; MPS interlock signal flow from down- to up-stream
  - MPS signal aggregation and transfer to Linac front-end through CCR to <u>stop beam</u>
    - Beam stop: all, MR-, MLF-inhibit
  - MR/HD/NU MPS signal sent to <u>D3 building</u> and <u>abort beam</u>



# **Machine Protection System**



Conceptual Schematic design during construction era (2006) February 24, 2006

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Several kinds of interlock signal gathering: vacuum, LLRF, general, beam loss

ATAC 2006



#### **MPS hardware for Linac/RCS**

#### • Linac/RCS

- VME size chassis with original backplane
  - MPS signals transfer through bus or RS-422/RS-485
  - VME/DIO, CPU used to monitor status, control, to be an IOC
- (1) Standard module: 236
- (2) BLM module: 88
  - comparator function enable to change threshold



Power Supply unit



(5-a) Front side of MPS chassis. 4 standard modules and 1 BLM module are installed.

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#### **Present hardware (Linac/RCS)**

- (3) E/O signal converter module: 16
  - Signal transfer for long distance; between buildings
- (4) Mask (& aggregation) module: 5
  - Signal aggregation and disable interlock logic depends on operational MODE
- (5) MPS chassis: 90
- + various "sub" system
  - Monitoring key magnet current, status of Liner motion device, beam destructive device...



Connectors for E/O and mask module Connectors for BLM module

(5-b)

Back side of MPS chassis. different\_type connectors



**Connectors for standard module** 





### **Beam destinations**

- A special application selects "beam destination" and advances state transition along certain sequences.
- MPS modifies interlock mask status according to "beam destinations".
- **PPS** controls "Area", where allowed region to deliver the beam. **PPS** also checks consistencies, modes and device status.
- "beam destination" transition TEST are performed just before beam operation starts.
  - All devices are ready to start beam.
  - It is easy to detect any defects and perform corrections (if necessary), before the scheduled beam operation.



## **Beam power limiter**

- Beam Current integrator with appropriate timing gate
- One hour limiter
  - "particle counter"
  - Required by PPS
- One pulse limiter for MLF and MR
  - Chopper (timing) failure caused too much beam
  - Since 2015
- Vacuum window protection
  - Zero degree beam dump (BD0) vacuum window broken within 6 seconds
  - Since 2018
- FCT at 3-50 BT
  - Monitoring numbers of particles for every pulse and one hour total



#### Fast beam stop scheme





### **MR inhibit scheme**

- Fast beam stop by switching off RFQ RF
- Ion Source Arc- and Extraction voltage shift
- Continue MLF beam
  - These logic realized by specially designed "Logic Controller"





#### **MPS performance**



#### **MPS reaction time**



# J-PARC New MPS project for Linac/RCS

construction phase in 2006 Almost 15 years passed...

- Requirements
  - Module aging, parts obsolete, technology succession, ...
  - More operational modes: Lack of flexibilities / signal lines
  - compatibility: Old and New system have to be used for some time range
- New hardware
  - Proto-type design started in 2018
  - New modules and chassis was designed
  - RCS: Standard modules already replaced
  - BLM modules under design
- Linac
  - First replacement has been done during this shutdown
    - Postponed for last year due to semi-conductor shortage and late delivery



#### Long term test





#### A few examples of failure events





- 2011/3/11 Large Earthquake
  - Accelerator was half day maintenance mode
- 2013/5/23 HD incident

#### 9 months shutdown

#### **6 months shutdown**

- Cause: EQ magnet PS failure ... new beam abort system
- **2015/11/2 and later: Chopper malfunction**Fact: Twice intensive beam (8E+13) than intended (4.3E+13)
  - **Cause: missing trigger pulse (due to O/E module)**
  - **1-shot MPS:** "num. of particles limiter for one pulse"
- 2016/2/25 vacuum chamber leak at MR abort beamline
  - Cause: noise stopped ramping up septum in the middle of cycle
  - ms-Abort (immediate beam abort system) was introduced
- 2017/4/19 short power outage (~ 3 seconds) •
  - Accelerator was half day maintenance mode
  - Sudden power outage during operation has been studied?



## **Past malfunction events (2)**

• 2018/3/30 Small earthquake

Half day interruption

- Many MPS and Linac FCT was broken, vacuum leak
- 2018/10/13 LI:BD0 vacuum window breakage
  - Without stopping beam, 25 Hz pulse beam hit the window after scraper removed.
  - Countermeasure: num. of particles limiter with proper time
    constant
    03:18:31 Beam destination change :LI BD30 → LI BD0
    - At present only BD0 no other BD...
- 2019/9/11 15:39 Unplanned power outage
  - During summer shutdown, maintenance period





## **Chopper malfunction**

- 2015/11 (November, 2015) and sometimes
  - Fact: Twice intensive beam (8E+13) than intended (4.3E+13)
  - Cause: missing trigger pulse (due to O/E module)
  - 1-shot MPS: "num. of particles limiter for one pulse"
- 2016/6/29 (29 June, 2016)
  - Beam current pattern by CT
    - Normal (up), MPS event (down)
  - Normally the pattern is exact comb shape
  - MPS events shows some residual beam
    - It is due to chopper malfunction
  - No beam loss in the linac
  - But heavy beam loss in the RCS
  - Root cause is timing module problem



# **L3BT:** Beam window destruction







# L3BT: Beam window destruction

- Date
  - October 13, 2018, 07:15 LI: beam tuning
- Event description

Stopped by bad vacuum Not by BLM!

- MPS: Bad vacuum at zero degree Beam Dump (BD0)
- Impact / consequence
  - Nine hours lost to figure it out. BD0 was forbidden for a few months.
  - Beam window was broken. Replaced in the end of year with grate care
- Root cause
  - <u>Full beam (50mA, 500us, 25Hz)</u> irradiated the window for six seconds
  - Human error (?) (not following ordinary procedure)
  - (BLM threshold was appropriate level...?)
- Countermeasure / preventing system
  - One second integral num. of particle limiter



#### **Summary**

#### • J-PARC MPS hardware and scheme presented

- Beam power limiter
- Beam stop/inhibit scheme
- Upgrade status reported
- Some MPS examples
  - MPS performance: response speed
  - A few examples of failure events