

EUROPEAN SPALLATION SOURCE



Experience with and plans for Machine protection system at ESS

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2022-10-11






1 Context MP-SoS

2 MP-SoS Verification Overview & Strategy

3 Challenges


Context Machine Protection Analysis Protection Functions (ESS-1089062) 9.5.1. BLE-FBIS-PE-1.1 - 1.6 (Beam Mode and Beam)






PF ID	BLE-FBIS-PF-1.1-	BLE-FBIS-PF-1.1-1.6							
PF Type	Global	Global							
Description	configured Beam the one distribute	Stop/prevent beam operation if FBIS detects that a system's configured Beam Mode and/or Beam Destination is different to the one distributed by the timing system and system is required for the current destination.							
Linked OPF	BLE-OPF-4	BLE-OPF-4 Linked Hazard BLE-HAZ-4							
Sensor / Input	Timing system	Timing system							
Logic	FBIS	FBIS							
Actuator	Beam Stop Actua	tor Systems							
PIL Requirement	PIL2	PIL2 Timing Requirement 500 ms							
	FBIS-PF-1.1 (MPS	ID)							
	FBIS-PF-1.2 (MPS	Mag)							
Comments	FBIS-PF-1.3 (MPS	Vac)							
Comments	FBIS-PF-1.4 (BCM)								
	FBIS-PF-1.5 (MPSTrg)								
	FBIS-PF-1.6 (FIST)		FBIS-PF-1.6 (FIST)						


PF ID	BLE-ID-PF-1.1 - 1.	.6							
PF Type	Global								
Description	Stop/prevent beam operation if <i>Device</i> position switch "Position In" is not actuated when <i>Device</i> is the requested beam destination and beam mode is other than "No Beam".								
Linked OPF	BLE-OPF-1.1	Linked Hazard	BLE-HAZ-1.1						
Sensor / Input	Timing system <i>Device</i> position switch "Position In"								
Logic	MPSID FBIS								
Actuator	Beam stop actuators								
PIL Requirement	PIL 2 Timing Requirement 300 ms								
Comments	2. FCMEBT (M 3. FC1DTL (D 4. FC2DTL (D 5. IBSSPK (Sp	EBT-010:PBI-FC-001) MEBT-010:PBI-FC-001) MIL-020:PBI-FC-001) MIL-050:PBI-FC-001) MK-010LWU:ID-IBS-001) MBL-060LWU:ID-IBS-001)							



Context MP-SoS Full System Scope







Context MP-SoS Operator Interface


Machine Protection OPIs (Operator Interface)

Machine Protection System of Systems High Level Operating Screen FBIS **Global Beam Permit** Mode: Probe SRR2B SRR3 Destination: DTL2 Operator Beam ON LEBT FC DTL2 FC DTL4 FC Configuration Check MEBT FC (OUT (OUT Actuation: Inhibit Interlock OK Section 1 Section 3 IN Section 4 Status: OK Systems Section 0 Section 2 Insertable Devices MPSID 0 0 0 0 OK OK **Quadrupole Magnets** MPSMag 0 0 OK OK 0 MPSVac 0 0 OK OK Vacuum 0 Ion Source & LEBT 0 0 OK ISrc OK 0 0 OK OK RF Systems RF O PSS OK OK Acc PSS **MEBT Chopper LPS** MEBT CH OK OK OK BCM BCM OK **Actuator Feedbacks** Emergency: OK MAG PS FB MAG FSU RF Probe FB **BCM Beam Absence** FBIS FB Rearm **LEBT Chopper FB MEBT Chopper FB**



BADESADAGS MPSMag Overview Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 1 Section 2 Section 4 Section 1 Section 2 Section 4 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 4

MPSVac







Verification Overview & Strategy

- 1. Interfacing System verification specifications are reviewed by MP team against MP requirements, performed by system owners.
- 2. Beam Interlock systems are verified from interface for all systems in both simulation and production environment.
- 3. Subset of Protection Functions are tested in Final Integration Test, to test full chain protection functions and reaction times etc.

2


BIS Systems Site Integration Testing (SIT)

- MPSVac SIT Report (ESS-3271566)
- MPSMag SIT Report (ESS-3271572)
- MPSID SIT Report (ESS-3271573)
- FBIS SIT Report (ESS-3532799)

3

Final Integration Testing (FIT)

 MP-SoS NCL Final Integration Test Report ESS-3728373



ess

Actuator Systems – Test Reports

- Magnetron (ESS-3244791)
- High Voltage Power Supply (ESS-3244790)
- MEBT Chopper (ESS-3069798)
- LEBT Chopper (ESS-3491849)

Beam Current Monitors - Test Reports

- MEBT BCM 02 ESS-3523885
- MEBT BCM 01 ESS-3523880
- RFQ BCM 01 ESS-3523883
- LEBT BCM 01 ESS-3175492
- ISRC BCM 01 ESS-3523879

RFLPS RF-LPS System- Test Reports

- RFQ RFLPS ESS-4017667 -
- MEBT 1,2,3 ESS-4017668, ESS-4017668, ESS-401766
- DTL 1 ESS-401766

Slow LPS – Test Reports

- Ion Source PLC (ESS-3432635)
- Vacuum Interlock System (ESS-3260648, ESS-3260650, ESS-3179273
- Quadrupole Systems (11 x Quads) (Spec ESS-3069799)
- ID LPS Systems (up to16 devices)
 - ESS-3209965 (rev 2) LEBT FC
 - ESS-3213286 (rev 2) MEBT FC

MP-SoS Final Integration Testing

Overview of MP-SoS Final Integration testing (Full Chain / Beam Testing)



Test case 1 (Beam Disabled, verify mode change sequences, procedures and verify correct limits are set)

- Configuration Check Cycle through all Proton Beam Modes, using operational procedure for changing modes and verify BCM thresholds values.
 Configuration Mismatch Create Beam Mode mismatch and check operational procedures
- Configuration Check Cycle through all Proton Beam Destinations, using operational procedure for changing Proton Beam Destination and verify motion function of destinations.

Test case 2 (Beam Disabled, verify full chain PFs, diagnostics and operational procedures)

- Scenario 1: Full Chain Tests for Magnet, Vacuum, ID, RFLPS, BCM includes timing check and Procedural elements

Test case 3 (Beam Disabled, using waveform generator to test threshold values of BCMs)

- Scenario 1, 2, 3: Verify interlock function when BCM detects Beam Mode limits are exceeded
- Scenario 4, 5, 6: Verify that BCM Interlocks if Beam is detected downstream of Proton Beam Destination
- Scenario 7: Verify that BCM for ISrc ACCT Interlocks if beam is detected when in Plasma Conditioning Mode (Waveform Generator)

Test case 4 (Beam Enabled, BCM differential tests, and actuator tests)

- Scenario 1, 2, 3: Verify that BCM Interlocks if BCM Differential limit is exceeded between 2 BCMs Phase A (With Beam)
- Scenario 4: Machine Protection actuator testing for Magnetron
- Scenario 5: Machine Protection Actuator Testing for Choppers

ESS Facility Configuration Management based on documentation.


12				ESS Facility					
_			-		_	-			
13	ACC*	Target Station		+ NSS	Bu	+ ildings	Site and INFR		
L4	ISRC+LEBT	Active Cells Facility		BEER	B01	E01	REMS		
	RFQ	Cooling & Utility Plant		BIFROST	B02	E02	ACCP		
	MEBT	Casks Assembly		C-SPEC	D01	E03	ACC CDS		
	DTL	Neutron Beam Extraction Syste	ems	DREAM	D02	E04	ТМСР		
	SPK	Target Systems		ESTIA	D03	E05	TMCP CDS		
	MBL	PSV OCS		FREIA	D04	F01	TICP		
	HBL	Target Safety System		HEIMDAL	D05	F03	TS2 CDS		
	HEBT	TS PSS		LoKI	D06	F04	Т		
	DMPL	Fluid distribution TS Electrical		MAGIC	D07	G01	BIS Timing Distribution System		
	A2T			MIRACLES	D08	G02			
	ACC PSS	Proton Beam Monitoring Syste	ms	NMX	H01	G04	Technical Network		
	TS2	Shielding and Confinement		ODIN	H05	H06	ICS Computing Infrastructure		
	TS2 Timing Distribution	MRP		SKADI	H09	H10	Control Rooms		
	TS2 PSS	PBW		T-REX			Phase Reference Line		
	CIDLs in italics relate to sub CIs.	TS HVAC		VESPA			Process		
	VACUUM, RFS, WTRC and CNPW	Target Test Stands		RML			Electrical		
	will be included as a sub-item in			Test Beamline			Control & Monitoring		
	each of the relevant Accelerator sub	Accelerator sub CIDLs.		NSS Bunker			Fire Safety Systems		
	*Includes shielding walls (temporary,	chicane etc)					Transport		
							HVAC		
							Physical Protection		

CI = Configuration Item CIDL = Configuration Item Documentation List CCR = Configuration Change Request

Challenges

CCR process only relevant if changes affect documents!

https://confluence.esss.lu.se/display/EIS/Configuratio n+Management+for+ESS+Facility





Examples

Changes to Configuration.

CCR: ESS-3732221:

Temporary hardware masking of the MEBT Chopper feedback to FBIS until SRR2

CCR: ESS-4089190 Rev 1

Removing the MEBT chopper as beam stop actuator until SRR3

CCR: ESS-3528829

(Scope Change) Beam instrumentation systems in initial NCL phase - Beam Current Monitors

CCR: ESS-3481590

(Scope Change) Beam Instrumentation systems in initial NCL phases - insertable devices

CCR: ESS-4123454

Additional allowed beam modes in MPSID for DTL1 FC

CCR: ESS-4099584

Removing security cable between the FSU and the magnetron PS



CCR: ESS-##### Update MEBT Chopper PCB Interface for DTL04 conditioning

CCR: ESS-4224098

Sector gate values need to be temporarily masked for an initial phase of SCL conditioning and operation.

CCR: ESS-3999230

change of the allowed voltage range (on the HV platform) for beam extraction

Challenges

• Non Conformity: 10225 = MEBT Chopper not operational as beam stop actuator

Non Conformities (PIL = Protection Integrity Level of Protection Function)

Since the MEBT chopper is not operational as beam stop actuator, PIL 1 can not be reached for the fast protection function (less than 3 us). see "ACT COMB 5 - LEBT, MEBT CHOPPER" in "ESS-2755165 - PIL Report for Actuation Systems"

• Non Conformity: 10222 = LEBT cooling not compliant with PIL 1 requirement

sensors below are not compliant with MP-MC-REQ-2 (ESS-0151690) ACC.E02.W01.E01.BF011 (FIS-XXX) LEBT FC, ACC.E02.W01.E01.BF003 (FIS-XXX) LEBT EMU 1 ACC.E02.W01.E01.BF010 (FIS-XXX) LEBT EMU 2

- Non Conformity: 10226 = FBIS is not compliant with PIL 2 requirement
- Non Conformity: 10220 = BCM system not compliant with PIL 2 requirement



Challenges

Managing operational limits

NSOI-204

Temporarily Increase Threshold on Errant Beam Detection for DTL1 BCM from 3mA to 5mA

NSOI-208

Temporary Mask Interlock Function for DTL1 BCM Max Allowed Beam Current

NSOI-205

Temporary Mask DTL1 BCM Errant Beam Interlock Function

NSOI-163

Interlock Masking for Ion Source repeller voltage, LEBT repeller voltage

NSOI-171 Mask LEBT Collimator Thermocouple Interlock

<u>NSOI-191</u>

Permanently Change LEBT Repeller Threshold

9. APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE INTERLOCK CHANGE REQUEST PROCESS

More detailed responsibilities for roles as:

Change Requester (CHR):

- To generate the mask or change request using the "Interlock Mask Request" or "Interlock Change Request" JIRA task as shown in APPENDIX B and attaching it to the appropriate Mask/Change request in the logbook.
- To request the SO, SL and MSC⁸ and MPSoSC (if required) to review, comment and approve the request under the created JIRA task.
- To be responsible for clearly describing the interlock and the method of mask or change to the SO and SL and MSC⁸.
- To ensure the interlock is masked or changed after the required actions are taken.
- To ensure that SLs have been notified about the change. By adding them to the JIRA task (as watchers).
- To ensure that masking is removed (in coordination with SO) due time.

System Owner (SO):

- To have a clear understanding of the mask or change and why the mask or change is being applied.
- To perform a risk assessment, which documents the consequences and risks in case the interlock is changed. To document this in the JIRA task.
- To ensure the interlock mask or change is implemented after the required actions are taken.
- To ensure that masking is removed (in coordination with CHR) due time.

Machine Section Coordinator (MSC):

- To have a clear understanding of the mask or change and why the mask or change is being applied.
- To perform a risk assessment along with the organisational panel to their choice, which documents the consequences and risks in case the interlock is changed. To document this in the JIRA task.
- To ensure that masking is removed (in coordination with CHR) due time.

Shift Leader (SL) /Machine Section Coordinator:

• To ensure that the change request is completed satisfactorily and that the correct **SOs** have provided requested information and are notified.







Currently no centralised database for managing/tracking limits, excel file is used for this (ESS-3445208)

LEBT-LPS::BMD-Chop_WtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::BMD-Rep-01_WtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::BMD-Sol-01_WtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::BMD-Sol-01_WtrTempOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::BMD-Sol-02_WtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::BMD-Sol-02_WtrTempOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::ID-Coll_WtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT COLIMATOR TEMPERATURE					<u>NSOI-171</u>	masked		
LEBT-LPS::ID-IBS-001_WtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::ID-IRIS_Temp1-R	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::ID-IRIS_Temp2-R	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::ID-IRIS_WtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::ID-IRIS_WtrTempMax1Err	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::ID-IRIS_WtrTempMax2Err	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::LEBT-Vac-VGC-10000_iPrs-R	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::LEBT-Vac-VGC-10000_iPrsRDirect	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::LEBT-Vac-VGC-30000_Rly4_iStatR	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::LEBT-Vac-VGC-30000_Rly4_iStatRDirect	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PBI-EMU-001_HorWtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PBI-EMU-001_VerWtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::PBI-FC-001_WtrFlowOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCH-01_CurMaxErr	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCH-01_CurR-CT	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCH-01_EnCmd-R	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCH-02_CurMaxErr	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCH-02_CurR-CT	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCH-02_EnCmd-R	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCV-01_CurMaxErr	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCV-01_CurR-CT	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCV-01_EnCmd-R	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCV-02_CurMaxErr	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCV-02_CurR-CT	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSCV-02_EnCmd-R	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSRep-01_EnCmd	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSRep-01_Vol-R	Latched?	Local/BIS?						
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSRep-01_VolRDirect	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?					
LEBT-LPS::PwrC-PSRep-01_VolOK	Latched?	Local/BIS?	Safety?		<u>NSOI-191</u>	-2kV		
	1.1.1.15	Upton	0.6 + 0					



Thanks, Questions?

Supporting Slides Beam Modes and Destination

+													
	Beam modes vs Destinations	No Beam	Conditioning	Probe	Fast commissioning	RF test	Stability test	Slow commissioning	Fast tuning	Slow tuning	Long pulse verification	Shielding verification	Production
ſ	ISrc	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	TBD	Y
	LEBT FC (LEBT-010:PBI-FC- 001)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	TBD	Y
	MEBT FC (MEBT-010:PBI-FC- 001)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	TBD	Y	Y	Y	N	TBD	N
	DTL1 FC (<21 MeV) (DTL-010:PBI-FC-001 is the same device as DTL-020:PBI-FC-001)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	TBD	Y	Y	TBD	N	TBD	N
	DTL2 FC (20.4-40.1 MeV) (DTL-020:PBI-FC-001)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	N	TBD	N
	DTL4 FC (38-76 MeV) (DTL-040:PBI-FC-001)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	N	TBD	N

Table 1: Allowed combinations of beam destinations and beam modes for NCL commissioning to DTL4

Table 3: List of the defined Proton Beam Modes

Name	Max	Beam Paran	neter	Description
	I [mA]	T [μs]	f [Hz]	
No Beam	0	0	0	No Proton Beam
Conditioning	0	0	0	Plasma production, magnetron allowed but no extraction HV
Probe	6	5	1	First proton beam to be send through a section; non-damaging even in the case of total proton beam loss (even repeated); used to verify that machine configuration is not grossly incorrect
Fast commissioning	6	5	14	Limited proton beam loading; used for fast scans to rapidly determine/verify RF setpoints
RF Test	6	50	1	To perform an initial RF test with a longer pulse
Stability Test	6	50	14	To be used mostly for proton beam stability test
Slow Commissioning	62.5	5	1	Very short pulse planned to be used during Normal Conducting Linac commissioning. It would allow installation of the rest of the Linac in parallel to Beam Commissioning.
Fast tuning	62.5	5	14	Limited proton beam loading; used for fast scans to rapidly determine/verify RF setpoints and measure proton beam profiles with wire scanners.



Supporting Slides Beam Modes and BCM Limits



Beam Mode : Fast commissioning _Table 4: ACCTs threshold for the Probe beam Beam Mode : Probe ID: 30 ID:20 Upper Threshold ACCT name (mA) ACCT name Upper Threshold (mA) Max Pulse Length Max Repetition rate (Hz) (µs) ISrc Disabled ISrc Disabled Disabled 1.000001^{2} LEBT 8.4 LEBT $6+0.3^{3*}6+0.1^{4*}6 = 8.4$ $5+40^{5}+1^{6} = 46$ RFQ 6.6 RFQ 6.6 46 MEBT1 6.6 MEBT1 6.6 6 MEBT2 6.6 MFBT2 6.6 6 DTL1 6.6 DTL1 6.6 6 DTL2 6.6 DTL2 6.6 6 DTL3 6 DTL3 6.6 6.6 DTL4 6.6 6 DTL4 6.6

6

DTL5

6.6

_Table 5: ACCTs threshold for the Fast commissioning mode

Max Pulse

Length (µs)

Disabled

46

46

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

Max Repetition

rate (Hz)

14.000196

ID : 60			
ACCT name	Upper Threshold (mA)	Max Pulse Length (μន្ល)	Max Repetition rate (Hz)
ISrc	Disabled	Disabled	1.000001
LEBT	62.5+62.5*0.3+62.5*0.1 = 87.5	5+40+2 ⁷ +1 = 48	-
RFQ	68.75	48	-
MEBT1	68.75	8	-
MEBT2	68.75	8	-
DTL1	68.75	8	-
DTL2	68.75	8	-
DTL3	68.75	8	-
DTL4	68.75	8	
DTL5	68.75	8	-

ESS-2169873 - BCM Look Up Table for Beam Mode Consistency Checks during the ESS Normal Conducting Linac Commissioning

6.6

DTL5

Supporting Slides Changing Beam Modes and Destination

Mode & Destination

Proton Beam Mode

NoBeam

No Beam

Rf Test

Conditioning Probe

Stability Test

Fast Tuning Slow Tuning

Fast Commissioning

Slow Commissioning

Proton Beam Destination

ISrc


1 Src

d SC-IOC-001/

00_5_5_woMEBTCp.csv

1. Operator selects a predefined configuration from OPIs. Can only change when Beam is Stopped


(Requested Beam Mode (BM) and Beam Destination (BD)



3. **BIS Systems check status of all input systems relevant for destination. PLCs Send Configured Mode & Destination to FBIS.** (All upstream devices, all actuators)

4. BCM system updates thresholds for ACCTs based on new "requested" configuration (Hardcoded). Sends Configured Mode & Destination to FBIS and removes Beam Permit if Beam is outside the limits, (Values are based on look up tables)

5. FBIS Checks all systems have correct Configuration or inhibits beam, and that all Beam Permits are OK for Destination or Interlocks beam.



Management Systems

Timing Distribution System







