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{"sheet":"First Sheet","index":0,"n_rows":32,"n_cols":4,"rows_kept":32,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[25,1,30,1]]}
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["Risk assessment for Target PSS"]
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[null,null,"Name","Role/Title"]
[null,"Owner","Atefeh Sadeghzadeh","Control engineer, Target Control and Safety"]
[null,"Author","Atefeh Sadeghzadeh","Control engineer, Target Control and Safety"]
[null,"Reviewer","Mikael Olsson","Control engineer, Target Control and Safety"]
[null,null,"Afshin Farshidfar","Engineer for Safety Critical Systems, Protection Systems Group"]
[null,null,"Helen Boyer","OHS Group Leader, Occupational Health & Safety Group"]
[null,null,"Fredrik Tidholm","Radiation Protection Engineer, Radiation Protection Group"]
[null,null,"Linda Coney","Group Leader, Target Control and Safety"]
[null,null,"Jaime Arriagada","Target Commissioning Engineer, Target Operations & Maintenance Group"]
[null,"Approver","Rikard Linander","Head of Target Division"]

{"sheet":"Radiation Risk Index","index":1,"n_rows":49,"n_cols":18,"rows_kept":49,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[43,12,44,12],[41,2,42,2],[41,3,42,3],[41,5,42,5],[41,6,42,6],[43,2,44,2],[43,3,44,3],[43,5,44,5],[43,6,44,6],[41,12,42,12],[41,11,42,11],[0,0,0,7],[0,8,0,11],[0,13,0,17],[51,8,51,9],[5,2,6,2],[10,2,11,2],[19,2,20,2],[23,2,24,2],[35,2,36,2],[39,2,40,2],[5,12,6,12],[19,12,20,12],[23,12,24,12],[35,12,36,12],[39,12,40,12],[3,5,4,5],[3,6,4,6],[3,3,4,3],[5,5,6,5],[5,6,6,6],[5,3,6,3],[12,5,13,5],[12,6,13,6],[17,5,18,5],[17,6,18,6],[17,3,18,3],[8,3,9,3],[8,5,9,5],[8,6,9,6],[10,5,11,5],[10,6,11,6],[10,3,11,3],[39,3,40,3],[39,5,40,5],[39,6,40,6],[21,5,22,5],[21,6,22,6],[23,3,24,3],[23,5,24,5],[23,6,24,6],[33,6,34,6],[35,6,36,6],[29,6,32,6],[37,6,38,6],[19,3,20,3],[21,3,22,3],[37,2,38,2],[37,3,38,3],[33,5,34,5],[35,3,36,3],[35,5,36,5],[33,2,34,2],[33,3,34,3],[37,5,38,5],[12,12,15,12],[25,12,28,12],[29,12,32,12],[12,2,13,2],[25,2,28,2],[29,2,32,2],[14,2,15,2],[14,3,15,3],[14,5,15,5],[14,6,15,6],[25,3,28,3],[25,5,28,5],[25,6,28,6],[29,3,32,3],[29,5,32,5],[12,3,13,3]]}
["Radiation Hazard Identification",null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Risk Estimation and Reduction",null,null,null,null,"Post Implementation Review "]
[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,null,13,14,null,null,15]
["1","Radiation\nHazard \nNumber","Hazard","Source of Hazard ","Beam Mode ","Neutron FActory  Mode (from ESS-0005860)","Person Affected","Cause / Initiating Event","Likelihood \nper year\n(From ESS-1408051)","Target Risk\n(From \nESS-1408051)","Actions to Mitigate Risk\n (Risk Controls) Functions from ESS-2027007","Comments\nJustification for Likelihood / Target Risk","Comment…","Implemented Risk Controls and total Reduction factor","Residual Risk","Tolerable (Yes/NO)"," Further risk reduction ","Comments\nJustification for any residual risk"]
["D02.115.4001 (connection cell)","RadHaz1","Prompt\n Radiation 10^6 µSv/h \n","Prompt  radiation from the monolith near PBW sources and the primary cooling water close to pipes in the room.\n","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","time scale of the hazard 0.7 fraction of a year                                                  worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on\n","H1\n0.7","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_\na1)worker training \na2)RP procedures  (RP handbook ch.2)\na3) Shielding and barriers\n\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of access in normal operation through worker training and RP procedures (see ESS-0239718 \nESS Handbook for Radiation Protection Chapter 2. General Radiation Protection Rules)"]
["D02.115.4001 (connection cell)","RadHaz2","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^6 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)\n",null,"beam ON ",null,null,"event= worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on against normal operating procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-045_Grant/prevent human presence\na1)PSS lock\na2) Warning implemented by safety interlock system at the door to alret persons of potential risk\nb) Stop the beam in case of intrusion (WRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_)\nb1) Monitoring the access door by safety interlock system and Beam interlock \n \n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_ \nstop beam in case of intrusion \nWRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_ ( is a new function identified during this assessment)"]
["D02.115.4001","RadHaz3","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^6 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)","Prompt  radiation from the monolith near PBW sources and the primary cooling water close to pipes in the room.","beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n(Monolith closed)\n\n","worker","worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts\ntime scale of the hazard 0.3 fraction of a year  \n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a)WRSF-P-TUB-L1-034 prevent flux\na1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\n\n\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of beam operation with person present through trainings and procedures","The event is: worker is performing Maintenance (beam off) in the room during Beam OFF. If Beam goes ON by accident, then the worker is exposed to 10^6 uSv. This dose indicates that a total reliability of 10^-6 is needed to lower the probability to residual risk. "]
["D02.115.4001","RadHaz4",null,null,"beam Off",null,null,"worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts against normal operation procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-044_Prevent flux .  in ESS-2027007\n a1) Warning lights and sounders controlled by a safety interlock system inside and outside the room to alert people that operation is imminent. \na2) Safety interlock system preventing inadvertent request for energisation of bending magnets,\na3) Formalised search in the room prior to energisation of bending magnets,\na4) Possibility to manually switch-off the proton beam from inside the room (safety interlock system).\na5) Means of escape from inside the room through room access door.\n","H2 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-PTL1-01-prevent flux (trainings and RP procedures failure)"]
["D02.115.4001","RadHaz44","Residual radiation 100 (µSv/h)",null,"Beam Off","Cool-down (Monolith closed)",null," worker enters the room during cool-down against normal operating procedures","H2\n10^-2","≤10^-2","a1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\na4)A cooling down time which is defined and set by RP and enforced by PSS to be considered before allowing access to the room"]
["D02.115.4003","RadHaz5","Prompt\n Radiation 10^5 µSv/h \n","Prompt  radiation from the water cooling system pipes and  delay tank\n","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","time scale of the hazard 0.7 fraction of a year                                                  worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on\n","H1\n0.7","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_\na1)worker training \na2)RP procedures  (RP handbook ch.2)\na3) Shielding and barriers\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of access in normal operation through worker training and RP procedures (see ESS-0239718 \nESS Handbook for Radiation Protection Chapter 2. General Radiation Protection Rules)"]
["D02.115.4003","RadHaz6","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^5 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)\n",null,"beam ON ",null,null,"event= worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on against normal operating procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-045_Grant/prevent human presence\na1)PSS lock\na2) Warning implemented by safety interlock system at the door to alret persons of potential risk\nb) Stop the beam in case of intrusion (WRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_)\nb1) Monitoring the access door by safety interlock system and Beam interlock \n \n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_ \nstop beam in case of intrusion \nWRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_ ( is a new function identified during this assessment)"]
["D02.115.4003","RadHaz7","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^5 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)","Prompt  radiation from the water cooling system pipes and  delay tank\n","Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n\n","worker","worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts\ntime scale of the hazard 0.3 fraction of a year  \n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a)WRSF-P-TUB-L1-034 prevent flux\na1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\n\n\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of beam operation with person present through trainings and procedures","The event is: worker is performing Maintenance (beam off) in the room during Beam OFF. If Beam goes ON by accident, then the worker is exposed to 10^6 uSv. This dose indicates that a total reliability of 10^-6 is needed to lower the probability to residual risk."]
["D02.115.4003","RadHaz8",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts against normal operation procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-044_Prevent flux .  in ESS-2027007\n a1) Warning lights and sounders controlled by a safety interlock system inside and outside the room to alert people that operation is imminent. \na2) Safety interlock system preventing inadvertent request for energisation of bending magnets,\na3) Formalised search in the room prior to energisation of bending magnets,\na4) Possibility to manually switch-off the proton beam from inside the room (safety interlock system).\na5) Means of escape from inside the room through room access door.\n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-PTL1-01-prevent flux (trainings and RP procedures failure),\n"]
["D02.103.4003","RadHaz9","  4*2.2*10^3 µSv/h ","residual radiation ION exchanger\nPrompt radiation from Monolith\n","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","time scale of the hazard 0.7 fraction of a year                                                  worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on\n","H1\n0.7","≤10^-2","a)WRSF-P-TUB-L1-036_Grant/prevent Human Presence_\nWRSF-R-TUB-L1-037_Grant/prevent human presence_ \n\na1)worker training \na2)RP procedures  (RP handbook ch.2)\na3) Shielding and barriers"]
["D02.103.4003","RadHaz10",null,null,"beam ON ",null,null,"event= worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on against normal operating procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-036_Grant/prevent Human Presence_\nWRSF-R-TUB-L1-037_Grant/prevent human presence_ \na1)PSS lock\na2) Warning implemented by safety interlock system at the door to alret persons of potential risk\nb) Stop the beam in case of intrusion (new function identified in this assessment)\nb1) Monitoring the access door by safety interlock system and Beam interlock \n \n"]
["D02.103.4003","RadHaz11"," 4*2.2*10^3 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)\n","residual radiation ION exchanger\nPrompt radiation from Monolith\n","Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n","worker","worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts\ntime scale of the hazard 0.3 fraction of a year  \n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-034_Prevent flux_ (for Prompt radiation)\na1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures"]
["D02.103.4003","RadHaz12",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts against normal operation procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-044_Prevent flux_ (prompt radiation funtion, Level 2 function for the residual radiation to be identified)\n a1) Warning lights and sounders controlled by a safety interlock system inside and outside the room to alert people that operation is imminent. \na2) Safety interlock system preventing inadvertent request for energisation of bending magnets,\na3) Formalised search in the room prior to energisation of bending magnets,\na4) Possibility to manually switch-off the proton beam from inside the room (safety interlock system).\na5) Means of escape from inside the room through room access door."]
["D02.103.4003","RadHaz42","105 µSv/h","residual radiation from  Water Purification System\n","Beam Off","Cool-down",null,"Water Purification tanks contain residual radiation,  worker enters the room during cool-down against normal operating procedures","H2\n10^-2","≤10^-2","a1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\na4)A cooling down time which is defined and set by RP and enforced by PSS to be considered before allowing access to the room"]
["D02.103.4005","RadHaz13","Prompt\n Radiation 10^6 µSv/h \n","Prompt  radiation from the Monolith source .\n","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","time scale of the hazard 0.7 fraction of a year                                                  worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on\n","H1\n0.7","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_\na1)worker training \na2)RP procedures  (RP handbook ch.2)\na3) Shielding and barriers\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of access in normal operation through worker training and RP procedures (see ESS-0239718 \nESS Handbook for Radiation Protection Chapter 2. General Radiation Protection Rules)"]
["D02.103.4005","RadHaz14","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^6 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)\n",null,"beam ON ",null,null,"event= worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on against normal operating procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-045_Grant/prevent human presence\na1)PSS lock\na2) Warning implemented by safety interlock system at the door to alret persons of potential risk\nb) Stop the beam in case of intrusion (WRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_)\nb1) Monitoring the access door by safety interlock system and Beam interlock \n \n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_ \nstop beam in case of intrusion \nWRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_ ( is a new function identified during this assessment)"]
["D02.103.4005","RadHaz15","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^6 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)","Prompt  radiation from the Monolith source .\n","Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n","worker","worker is in  performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts\ntime scale of the hazard 0.3 fraction of a year  \n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a)WRSF-P-TUB-L1-034 prevent flux\na1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\n\n\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of beam operation with person present through trainings and procedures","The event is: worker is performing Maintenance (beam off) in the room during Beam OFF. If Beam goes ON by accident, then the worker is exposed to 10^6 uSv. This dose indicates that a total reliability of 10^-6 is needed to lower the probability to residual risk. "]
["D02.103.4005","RadHaz16",null,null,"Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n","worker","worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts against normal operation procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-044_Prevent flux .  in ESS-2027007\n a1) Warning lights and sounders controlled by a safety interlock system inside and outside the room to alert people that operation is imminent. \na2) Safety interlock system preventing inadvertent request for energisation of bending magnets,\na3) Formalised search in the room prior to energisation of bending magnets,\na4) Possibility to manually switch-off the proton beam from inside the room (safety interlock system).\na5) Means of escape from inside the room through room access door.\n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-PTL1-01-prevent flux (trainings and RP procedures failure)"]
["D02.091.4002","RadHaz17","Prompt\n Radiation 10^4 µSv/h \n","Prompt  radiation from the monolith and Beam lines in Bunker","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","time scale of the hazard 0.7 fraction of a year                                                  worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on\n","H1\n0.7","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_\na1)worker training \na2)RP procedures  (RP handbook ch.2)\na3) Shielding and barriers\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of access in normal operation through worker training and RP procedures (see ESS-0239718 \nESS Handbook for Radiation Protection Chapter 2. General Radiation Protection Rules)"]
["D02.091.4002","RadHaz18","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^4 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)\n",null,"beam ON ",null,null,"event= worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on against normal operating procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-045_Grant/prevent human presence\na1)PSS lock\na2) Warning implemented by safety interlock system at the door to alret persons of potential risk\nb) Stop the beam in case of intrusion (WRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_)\nb1) Monitoring the access door by safety interlock system and Beam interlock \n \n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_ \nstop beam in case of intrusion \nWRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_ ( is a new function identified during this assessment)"]
["D02.091.4002","RadHaz19","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^4 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)","Prompt  radiation from the monolith and Beam lines in Bunker","Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n","worker","worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts\ntime scale of the hazard 0.3 fraction of a year  \n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a)WRSF-P-TUB-L1-034 prevent flux\na1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\n\n\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of beam operation with person present through trainings and procedures","The event is: worker is performing Maintenance (beam off) in the room during Beam OFF. If Beam goes ON by accident, then the worker is exposed to 10^6 uSv. This dose indicates that a total reliability of 10^-6 is needed to lower the probability to residual risk. "]
["D02.091.4002","RadHaz20",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts against normal operation procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-044_Prevent flux .  in ESS-2027007\n a1) Warning lights and sounders controlled by a safety interlock system inside and outside the room to alert people that operation is imminent. \na2) Safety interlock system preventing inadvertent request for energisation of bending magnets,\na3) Formalised search in the room prior to energisation of bending magnets,\na4) Possibility to manually switch-off the proton beam from inside the room (safety interlock system).\na5) Means of escape from inside the room through room access door.\n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-PTL1-01-prevent flux (trainings and RP procedures failure)"]
["D02.091.4002","RadHaz21","150 µSv/h if LSS is open","Redisual  radiation from the monolith in Bunker\n","Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n","worker","worker is in this room performing Maintenance (beam off) exposed to residual radaition from monolith","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","- worker training\n- operator training\n- RP procedures\n- Light shutters remain closed\n(A description about why these mitigation are added(because of ALARA) can be added here)\n\n\n","PSS to forsee a feature to bypass PSS interlock with Light Shutters at the time of any of Light Shutters Maintenance (beam off)s (ESS-XXXX)","PSS to control  the room access bacause of the ALARA perspective"]
["D02.091.4002","RadHaz22",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"worker is in this room performing Maintenance (beam off) and the Light Shutters open inadvertantly\n","H2\n10^-2","10^-2","- PSS preventing inadvertantly opening of Light Shutters\n- ensure no worker in the room (search and secure)\n- alert worker to impending Light Shutters opening\n- Means of escape from inside the room through the room access door.\n(A description about why these mitigation are added(because of ALARA) can be added here)\n","PSS to forsee a feature to bypass PSS interlock with Light Shutters at the time of any of Light Shutters Maintenance (beam off)s (ESS-XXXX)"]
["D02.091.4002","RadHaz23",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"Access to the room when the Light Shutters are open","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","- Signage\n- Doors to prevent access to the room where access points are required. \n- Shielding and barriers to prevent access\n\n","PSS to forsee a feature to bypass PSS interlock with Light Shutters at the time of any of Light Shutters Maintenance (beam off)s (ESS-XXXX)"]
["D02.091.4002","RadHaz24",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"intrusion to the room when the light shutters are open","H2\n10^-2","<10^-2","- Warnings implemented outside the room access door to alert persons of potential risk.\n- Locking of the room access door by safety interlock system.","PSS to forsee a feature to bypass PSS interlock with Light Shutters at the time of any of Light Shutters Maintenance (beam off)s (ESS-XXXX)"]
["D02.091.4004","RadHaz25","150 µSv/h if LSS is open","Redisual  radiation from the monolith in Bunker\n","Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n","worker","worker is in this room performing Maintenance (beam off) exposed to residual radaition from monolith","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","- worker training\n- operator training\n- RP procedures\n- Light shutters remain closed\n(A description about why these mitigation are added(because of ALARA) can be added here)\n\n\n","PSS to forsee a feature to bypass PSS interlock with Light Shutters at the time of any of Light Shutters Maintenance (beam off)s (ESS-XXXX), based on the dose rate, PSS is not required to reach the Target risk but PSS will Control the access for ALARA","PSS to control  the room access bacause of the ALARA perspective"]
["D02.091.4004","RadHaz26",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"worker is in this room performing Maintenance (beam off) and the Light Shutters open inadvertantly\n","H2\n10^-2","10^-2","- PSS preventing inadvertantly opening of Light Shutters\n- ensure no worker in the room (search and secure)\n- alert worker to impending Light Shutters opening\n- Means of escape from inside the room through the room access door.\n(A description about why these mitigation are added(because of ALARA) can be added here)\n","PSS to forsee a feature to bypass PSS interlock with Light Shutters at the time of any of Light Shutters Maintenance (beam off)s (ESS-XXXX), based on the dose rate, PSS is not required to reach the Target risk but PSS will Control the access for ALARA"]
["D02.091.4004","RadHaz27",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"Access to the room when the Light Shutters are open","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","- Signage\n- Doors to prevent access to the room where access points are required. \n- Shielding and barriers to prevent access\n\n","PSS to forsee a feature to bypass PSS interlock with Light Shutters at the time of any of Light Shutters Maintenance (beam off)s (ESS-XXXX), based on the dose rate, PSS is not required to reach the Target risk but PSS will Control the access for ALARA"]
["D02.091.4004","RadHaz28",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"intrusion to the room when the light shutters are open","H2\n10^-2","10^-2","- Warnings implemented outside the room access door to alert persons of potential risk.\n- Locking of the room access door by safety interlock system.","PSS to forsee a feature to bypass PSS interlock with Light Shutters at the time of any of Light Shutters Maintenance (beam off)s (ESS-XXXX), based on the dose rate, PSS is not required to reach the Target risk but PSS will Control the access for ALARA"]
["D02.091.4004","RadHaz29","Prompt\n Radiation 10^4 µSv/h \n","Prompt  radiation from the monolith and Beam lines in Bunker\n","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","time scale of the hazard 0.7 fraction of a year                                                  worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on\n","H1\n0.7","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_\na1)worker training \na2)RP procedures  (RP handbook ch.2)\na3) Shielding and barriers\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of access in normal operation through worker training and RP procedures (see ESS-0239718 \nESS Handbook for Radiation Protection Chapter 2. General Radiation Protection Rules)"]
["D02.091.4004","RadHaz30",null,null,"beam ON ",null,null,"event= worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on against normal operating procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-045_Grant/prevent human presence\na1)PSS lock\na2) Warning implemented by safety interlock system at the door to alret persons of potential risk\nb) Stop the beam in case of intrusion (WRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_)\nb1) Monitoring the access door by safety interlock system and Beam interlock \n \n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_ \nstop beam in case of intrusion \nWRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_ ( is a new function identified during this assessment)"]
["D02.091.4004","RadHaz31","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^4 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)","Prompt  radiation from the monolith and Beam lines in Bunker\n","Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n","worker","worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts\ntime scale of the hazard 0.3 fraction of a year  \n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a)WRSF-P-TUB-L1-034 prevent flux\na1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\n\n\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of beam operation with person present through trainings and procedures","The event is: worker is performing Maintenance (beam off) in the room during Beam OFF. If Beam goes ON by accident, then the worker is exposed to 10^6 uSv. This dose indicates that a total reliability of 10^-6 is needed to lower the probability to residual risk. "]
["D02.091.4004","RadHaz32",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts against normal operation procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-044_Prevent flux .  in ESS-2027007\n a1) Warning lights and sounders controlled by a safety interlock system inside and outside the room to alert people that operation is imminent. \na2) Safety interlock system preventing inadvertent request for energisation of bending magnets,\na3) Formalised search in the room prior to energisation of bending magnets,\na4) Possibility to manually switch-off the proton beam from inside the room (safety interlock system).\na5) Means of escape from inside the room through room access door.\n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-PTL1-01-prevent flux (trainings and RP procedures failure)"]
["D02.091.4005","RadHaz33","Prompt\n Radiation 10^7 µSv/h \n","Prompt Radiation dominated by neutrons from the monolith sources\n","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","time scale of the hazard 0.7 fraction of a year                                                  worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on\n","H1\n0.7","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_\na1)worker training \na2)RP procedures  (RP handbook ch.2)\na3) Shielding and barriers\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of access in normal operation through worker training and RP procedures (see ESS-0239718 \nESS Handbook for Radiation Protection Chapter 2. General Radiation Protection Rules)"]
["D02.091.4005","RadHaz34",null,null,"beam ON ",null,null,"event= worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on against normal operating procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-045_Grant/prevent human presence\na1)PSS lock\na2) Warning implemented by safety interlock system at the door to alret persons of potential risk\nb) Stop the beam in case of intrusion (WRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_)\nb1) Monitoring the access door by safety interlock system and Beam interlock \n \n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_ \nstop beam in case of intrusion \nWRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_ ( is a new function identified during this assessment)"]
["D02.091.4005","RadHaz35","Prompt\n Radiation\n4*10^7 µSv/event\n(4 hours shift considered)","Prompt Radiation dominated by neutrons from the monolith sources\n","Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n","worker","worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts\ntime scale of the hazard 0.3 fraction of a year  \n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a)WRSF-P-TUB-L1-034 prevent flux\na1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\n\n\n","Target of 1 X 10 -2  selected based on reducing the likelihood of beam operation with person present through trainings and procedures","The event is: worker is performing Maintenance (beam off) in the room during Beam OFF. If Beam goes ON by accident, then the worker is exposed to 10^6 uSv. This dose indicates that a total reliability of 10^-6 is needed to lower the probability to residual risk. "]
["D02.091.4005","RadHaz36",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts against normal operation procedures\n","H2\n10^-2","<10^-6","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-044_Prevent flux .  in ESS-2027007\n a1) Warning lights and sounders controlled by a safety interlock system inside and outside the room to alert people that operation is imminent. \na2) Safety interlock system preventing inadvertent request for energisation of bending magnets,\na3) Formalised search in the room prior to energisation of bending magnets,\na4) Possibility to manually switch-off the proton beam from inside the room (safety interlock system).\na5) Means of escape from inside the room through room access door.\n","H3 was selected as the likelihood of failure of WRSF-PTL1-01-prevent flux (trainings and RP procedures failure)"]
["D02.091.4003","RadHaz37","Prompt\n Radiation 500 µSv/h \n","Prompt Radiation  from the monolith sources\n","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","time scale of the hazard 0.7 fraction of a year                                                  worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on\n","H1\n0.7","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L1-035_Grant/prevent human presence_\na1)worker training \na2)RP procedures  (RP handbook ch.2)\na3) Shielding and barriers\n","Reason for preventing function is PSS design ","PSS to control  the room access because of the ALARA perspective"]
["D02.091.4003","RadHaz38",null,null,"beam ON ",null,null,"event= worker enters the room during Production (beam on)/beam on against normal operating procedures\n","H1\n0.7","<10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-045_Grant/prevent human presence\n in ESS-2027007\na1)PSS lock\na2) Warning implemented by safety interlock system at the door to alret persons of potential risk\nb) Stop the beam in case of intrusion: WRSF-P-TUB-L3-061_Stop flux_\nb1) Monitoring the access door by safety interlock system and Beam interlock \n \n"]
["D02.091.4003","RadHaz39","Prompt\n Radiation is negligible\n(4 hours shift considered)",null,"Beam Off","Maintenance/ Start-up\n\n","worker","worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts\ntime scale of the hazard 0.3 fraction of a year  \n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a)WRSF-P-TUB-L1-034 prevent flux\na1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\n\n\n",null,"The event is: worker is performing Maintenance (beam off) in the room during Beam OFF."]
["D02.091.4003","RadHaz40",null,null,"Beam Off",null,null,"worker is in the room performing Maintenance (beam off) and operation starts against normal operation procedures\n","H1\n0.3","≤10^-2","a) WRSF-P-TUB-L2-044_Prevent flux .  in ESS-2027007\n a1) Warning lights and sounders controlled by a safety interlock system inside and outside the room to alert people that operation is imminent. \na2) Safety interlock system preventing inadvertent request for energisation of bending magnets,\na3) Formalised search in the room prior to energisation of bending magnets,\na4) Possibility to manually switch-off the proton beam from inside the room (safety interlock system).\na5) Means of escape from inside the room through room access door.\n"]
["D02.091.4003","Radhaz43","103 µSv/h","residual radiation from  Ion excjhanger\n","Beam Off","Cool-down",null,"While emptying the spent and decayed resin via unshielded pipes, the dose rate can reach the same level as inside the ion exchanger shielding, i.e. up to the order of 10^3 µSv/h,  worker enters the room during cool-down against normal operating procedures","H2\n10^-2","≤10^-2","a1) worker training\na2) operator training\na3)RP procedures\na4)A cooling down time which is defined and set by RP and enforced by PSS to be considered before allowing access to the room"]
["D03.100.1001 ","RadHaz41","40 µSv/event (4 hour shift)","Prompt radiation from primary water cooling, People in experimental hall get exposed to promopt iosining radiation because the lead bunker in D02.115.4003  door is left open","beam ON ","Production\n\n","worker","event= People outside of the room get exposed to promopt iosining radiation because the bunker door is left open\n","H2\n≤  10 -2 ","H2\n≤  10 -2 ","a1)RP procedures and training\na2) Work Permit \na3)PSS safety interlock to ensure the bunker door is closed \n","stop beam in case of lead bunker door left open ","when the beam is on, the access to the D02.103.4003 is controlled by the PSS and to break into the bunker, they should first break the access to the room!"]
[]
["Note that conventional hazards  will be assessed based on ESS guidline in a separate document"]

{"sheet":"Required Information for PSS","index":2,"n_rows":127,"n_cols":8,"rows_kept":127,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[16,0,16,4],[16,5,16,9],[22,0,22,9],[24,0,24,9],[25,0,25,4],[25,5,25,9],[0,0,0,9],[2,5,2,9],[3,0,3,4],[3,5,3,9],[4,0,4,4],[4,5,4,9],[5,0,5,4],[5,5,5,9],[6,0,6,4],[6,5,6,9],[10,0,10,8],[11,0,11,9],[13,0,13,9],[15,0,15,4],[15,5,15,9],[17,0,17,4],[17,5,17,9],[18,0,18,4],[18,5,18,9],[20,0,20,9],[21,0,21,10],[42,5,42,9],[43,0,43,9],[44,0,44,4],[44,5,44,9],[26,0,26,4],[26,5,26,9],[27,0,27,4],[27,5,27,9],[28,0,28,4],[28,5,28,9],[30,0,30,9],[31,0,31,4],[31,5,31,9],[32,0,32,4],[32,5,32,9],[33,0,33,4],[33,5,33,9],[36,0,36,4],[36,5,36,9],[37,0,37,4],[37,5,37,9],[38,0,38,4],[38,5,38,9],[40,0,40,9],[41,0,41,4],[41,5,41,9],[63,0,63,9],[64,0,64,9],[45,0,45,4],[45,5,45,9],[46,0,46,4],[46,5,46,9],[47,5,47,9],[48,0,48,9],[49,0,49,4],[49,5,49,9],[51,0,51,9],[53,0,53,9],[54,0,54,9],[55,0,55,9],[57,0,57,4],[57,5,57,9],[58,0,58,4],[58,5,58,9],[59,0,59,4],[59,5,59,9],[60,0,60,4],[60,5,60,9],[61,0,61,4],[61,5,61,9],[81,0,81,9],[82,0,82,9],[66,0,66,4],[66,5,66,9],[67,0,67,4],[67,5,67,9],[68,0,68,4],[68,5,68,9],[69,0,69,4],[69,5,69,9],[70,0,70,4],[70,5,70,9],[72,0,72,9],[73,0,73,9],[75,0,75,4],[75,5,75,9],[76,0,76,4],[76,5,76,9],[77,0,77,4],[77,5,77,9],[78,0,78,4],[78,5,78,9],[79,0,79,4],[79,5,79,9],[99,0,99,9],[100,0,100,9],[84,0,84,4],[84,5,84,9],[85,0,85,4],[85,5,85,9],[86,0,86,4],[86,5,86,9],[87,0,87,4],[87,5,87,9],[88,0,88,4],[88,5,88,9],[90,0,90,9],[91,0,91,9],[93,0,93,4],[93,5,93,9],[94,0,94,4],[94,5,94,9],[95,0,95,4],[95,5,95,9],[96,0,96,4],[96,5,96,9],[97,0,97,4],[97,5,97,9],[117,0,117,2],[117,3,117,6],[117,7,117,9],[102,0,102,4],[102,5,102,9],[103,0,103,4],[103,5,103,9],[104,0,104,4],[104,5,104,9],[105,0,105,4],[105,5,105,9],[106,0,106,4],[106,5,106,9],[108,0,108,9],[109,0,109,9],[110,0,110,9],[111,0,111,9],[112,0,112,9],[114,0,115,2],[114,3,115,6],[114,7,115,9],[116,0,116,2],[116,3,116,6],[116,7,116,9],[122,3,122,6],[122,7,122,9],[118,0,118,2],[118,3,118,6],[118,7,118,9],[123,0,123,9],[124,0,124,9],[126,0,126,9],[121,0,121,2],[121,3,121,6],[121,7,121,9],[122,0,122,2],[119,0,119,2],[119,3,119,6],[119,7,119,9],[120,0,120,2],[120,3,120,6],[120,7,120,9]]}
["2.  PARENT SYSTEM CONTACT DETAILS"]
[]
[null,null,null,null,null,"Organizational unit"]
["ESS organisational unit responsible for Target Station development",null,null,null,null,"Target Division"]
["Manufacturing facility",null,null,null,null,"ESS"]
["System owner",null,null,null,null,"ESS"]
["Contact person(s) for PSS",null,null,null,null,"Afshin Farshidfar"]
[]
[]
[]
["3. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM"]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["Note: If the information for all items in this section comes from a single document, give the CHESS number for that document for all required information here. "]
[]
["High level description of the Target Station",null,null,null,null,"ESS-1423053 Target station SDD"]
[]
["Drawings with components and equipment",null,null,null,null,"If Any"]
["Physical boundary of Target Station",null,null,null,null,"Refer to ESS Plant Layout "]
[]
["4. OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SYSTEM "]
[]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["Operating hours"]
["Number of days per year in operation",null,null,null,null,"Target Station is planned to be operated 225 days per year during normal operation. (200 days in the facility operation mode, 25 days target test)"]
["Number of hours per day in operation",null,null,null,null,"Target Station is planned to be operated 24 hours per day during normal operation. "]
["Number of planned shutdowns per year",null,null,null,null,"Target Station is planned to be in shutdown 2 times per year."]
["Length (in hours) of each planned shutdown",null,null,null,null,"Each shutdown is expected to last on average 1428 hours (min. 1368  hours and max. 1488 hours). Basen on ESS ConOps (ESS-0003640)"]
[]
["Manning levels and shift arrangements  "]
["Number of shifts per day for operators",null,null,null,null,"The number of shifts for operators will be 3 per day."]
["Number of hours per shift for operators",null,null,null,null,"The number of hours per shift for operators will be 8."]
["Number of people per shift (in total and in the control room)",null,null,null,null,"There will be in total  of minimum 2 people/shift in the MCR and they will operate the accelerator and the neutron factory parts of the facility, which includes Target PSS screens (more people will be in the control room). They both will be inside the control room.\n\nNote: The current plan and requirement from SSM is that the accelerator is not allowed to run without personnel present in the control room, but 24/7 basis may not be possible due to other reasons, in which case the machine will be shut down."]
[]
[]
["Routine inspections: frequency, number of people",null,null,null,null,"No routine inspection defined yet. This will be reavluated after detail design."]
["Time that the control room is manned",null,null,null,null,"The control room will be manned 7 days per week and 24 hours per day."]
["Minimum number of people expected (personnel) in the control room",null,null,null,null,"The expected minimum number of people present in the control room at any one time point is 2."]
[]
["Modes of operation for the system"]
[]
[]
["Maintenance"]
["Number of planned / unplanned maintenance activities per month (or year)",null,null,null,null,"The number of planned maintenance activities per year is 2\n\nThe expected number of unplanned maintenance activities cannot be estimated at this point. It will be re-evaluated during critical design phase or commissioning."]
["Number of people during maintenance activity",null,null,null,null,"Refer to data for each room described below in this table.\n"]
["Number of hours per maintenance activity ",null,null,null,null,"Two long maintanance periods per year is expected, one in winter (~6 weeks) and the other in summer (~10\nweeks). The maintnance will be carried out 8h/day/team.  Some Target Station maintenance activities will take place on the evening shift (16:00 to midnight) or the night shift (midnight to 08:00)."]
[]
["Operational procedures"]
[]
[]
["5. OCCUPANCY INFORMATION FOR THE SYSTEM"]
[]
[]
["5.1. D02.091.4002"]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["Number of entries expected during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen ."]
["Length (in hours) of one entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The expected number of people entering D02.091.4002 during shutdown is 3 - 4 per entry. "]
["Time per entry (in hours) during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The average length of time for an entry to D02.091.4002 during shutdown is 8 hours(one shift)."]
[]
["5.1. D02.091.4004"]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["Number of entries expected during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Length (in hours) of one entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The expected number of people entering D02.091.4004 during shutdown is 3 - 4 per entry."]
["Time per entry (in hours) during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The average length of time for an entry to D02.091.4004 during shutdown is 8 hours(one shift)."]
[]
["5.1. D02.091.4005"]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["Number of entries expected during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Length (in hours) of one entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The expected number of people entering D02.091.4005 during shutdown is 3 - 4 per entry."]
["Time per entry (in hours) during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The average length of time for an entry to D02.091.4005 during shutdown is 8 hours(one shift)."]
[]
["5.1. D02.103.4003"]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["Number of entries expected during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Length (in hours) of one entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The expected number of people entering D02.103.4003 during shutdown is 3 - 4 per entry."]
["Time per entry (in hours) during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The average length of time for an entry to D02.103.4003 during shutdown is 8 hours(one shift)."]
[]
["5.1. D02.115.4003"]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["Number of entries expected during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Length (in hours) of one entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The expected number of people entering D02.115.4003 during shutdown is 3 - 4 per entry."]
["Time per entry (in hours) during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The average length of time for an entry to D02.115.4003 during shutdown is 8 hours(one shift)."]
[]
["5.1. D02.115.4001"]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["Number of entries expected during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Length (in hours) of one entry during operational days",null,null,null,null,"Currently no entries to TS PSS controlled areas during operational days is foreseen . "]
["Number of people per entry during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The expected number of people entering D02.115.4001 during shutdown is 6 - 8 per entry."]
["Time per entry (in hours) during shutdown",null,null,null,null,"The average length of time for an entry to D02.115.4001 during shutdown is 8 hours(one shift)."]
[]
["6. HUMAN FACTORS"]
["The table below gives the errors likely to be caused by personnel (including operators), their consequence and likelihood. "]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["<< Fill in the table below with all human errors that can occur, their consequence and likelihood >>"]
[]
["Event",null,null,"Event Description",null,null,null,"Likelihood: <<…>> "]
[]
["Bending Magnets inadvertently energised",null,null,"Conservative assumption is that, without TS PSS in place, a trained person would energise Bending Magnets (turn on beam on Target) before checking that all people have left the TS PSS controlled area once in hundred operations. \nHere is assumed that written procedure for energising Bending Magnets exists and the task is carried out with low level of stress.\n",null,null,null,"Likelihood: 0.01 "]
["Intrusion into TS PSS controlled area during Beam On Target through Access Doors:",null,null,"Intrusion (unauthorised entry) to TS PSS controlled area during Beam On is conservatively estimated to be once per year, compared to the estimation in the risk assessment for Target. \n• This covers scenarios where a person tries to enter the TS PSS controlled area, intentionally or by mistake, whilst the Beam is On Target and area is hazardous. \n• There are warning signs to let people know about TS PSS controlled area hazards. \n• The area outside the TS PSS controlled areas are accessible to workers who might not be familiar with the hazards.",null,null,null,"Likelihood: \n1/yr"]
["Intrusion into TS PSS controlled area during Beam On Target through Emergency Exit Door",null,null,"Intrusion through E-Exit doors to TS PSS controlled area during Beam on Target is conservatively estimated to be once per ten years. \nDoors are locked and thare are clear warning signs to let people know such doors shall not be used for entering the area. ",null,null,null,"Likelihood: \n0.1/yr"]
["Formalised search error",null,null,"\nThe formalised search will be carried out by one authorised person, independently for each room. It will ensure that there are no people left in any parts of TS PSS controlled area before allowing Beam on Target through Bending magnets. \nThe rooms are fairily small and visibility inside is quite clear for carrying out the formalized search, so it is conservatively assumed that a procedure will fail (meaning that a person would be missed by search) once in hundred procedures.",null,null,null,"Probability of failure of search procedure: 0.01"]
[null,null,null,"Any Other human error?"]
[]
[]
["7. CONSEQUENCES"]
["Note: << Add note with additional information (optional) >>"]
[]
["<< Give consequences of failed mitigation of hazards. For example, this could be a radiation dose if some hazardous event happens. >>"]

{"sheet":"D02 Map","index":3,"n_rows":74,"n_cols":2,"rows_kept":74,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
[]
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[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[null,"D02 level 115"]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[null,"D02 level 100"]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
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[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[null,"D02 level 90"]

{"sheet":"References","index":4,"n_rows":14,"n_cols":2,"rows_kept":14,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[13,1,13,5]]}
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[null,"References:"]
[null,"Concept of operations for the Target Satation System (ESS-0005860) "]
[null,"ESS Guidline for Radiological Hazard Analysis Dedicated to Protection of Workers (ESS-1408051)"]
[null,"ESS Concept of Operations Description (ESS-0003640)"]
[null,"Radiological hazards induced in the target utility block during normal operation and corresponding radiation safety provisions ( ESS-2027007)"]
[null,"Response to review comments - Risk assessment for Target PSS, ESS-4121077 (ESS-4786003)"]
[null,"Target station SDD Sol ESS-1423053 "]

{"sheet":"Revision History","index":5,"n_rows":5,"n_cols":3,"rows_kept":5,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["Revision History"]
[]
["Revision","Date","Description of changes"]
[1,"2022-10-17","First issue"]
[2,"2024-02-23","second revision\n -comments from the previous revision accomodated, see ESS-4786003,  \n-D02 map added\n-Target risk of L1 function changed from <10^-2 to ≤10^-2 according to ESS-1408051\n-room D02.091.4003 added RadHaz 37,38,39,40, PSS to control  the room access because of the ALARA perspective\n -risk of people getting high dose in experimental hall  in case of the lead bunker door left open in D02.100.1001 was added, see Radiation Risk index page, Radhaz 41\n - Radhaz 42, Radhaz 43 and Radhaz 44 added to cover hazard of residual radiation during cooldown for rooms 103.4003, 091.4003 and 115.4001\n- color coding removed from the rooms \n-Sheet required information for PSS, average shutdown hours updated to 1428 hours (min. 1368  hours and max. 1488 hours). "]

{"sheet":"Instruction","index":6,"n_rows":0,"n_cols":0,"rows_kept":0,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}

{"sheet":"ChessLinks","index":7,"n_rows":1,"n_cols":1,"rows_kept":1,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ESS-1408051"]