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Machine Protection Glossary

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1. SCOPE

This document contains the definitions and explanations of terms that are used in the context of Machine Protection at ESS.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to create a glossary that provides a clear definition of terms and concepts to simplify communication when discussing Machine Protection at ESS.

3. **DEFINITIONS**

Term	Definitions	
Machine	In the context of ESS Machine Protection, the term "Machine" encompasses all elements in the Accelerator, Target Station and Neutron Science system segments; all elements necessary for neutron beam production and its further use by the neutron science experiments.	
Failure	The Machine , a device or data being affected by internal factors in such a way that it (partly or entirely) cannot perform its intended task.	
Hazard	Potential source of Damage or Activation .	
Damage	The Machine or data being affected by external factors in such a way that it (partly or entirely) cannot perform its intended task.	
Activation	Induced radioactivity in previously stable material through exposure to radiation.	
Damage Event	Event in which a Hazard results in Damage .	
Activation Event	Event in which a Hazard results in Activation .	
Damage Risk	Combination of the frequency of occurrence of Damage and the severity of that Damage .	
Activation Risk	Combination of the frequency of occurrence of Activation and the severity of that Activation .	
Hazardous State	State that might lead to unacceptable Damage Risk s or Activation Risk s for the Machine .	

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Protected State	State in which the Machine is free from unacceptable Damage and Activation Risk s.	
Off-nominal state	A state of the equipment or the controlled process that might result in a Hazard .	
Overall Protection Function	Means of achieving or maintaining a Protected State for the Machine , in respect to one specific Hazard . The Overall Protection Function does not specify the technology to be used to achieve the means.	
Protection Function	Function implemented by one or several MP-related Systems, which is intended to achieve and maintain the Protected State of the Machine in respect to one specific Hazard. A Protection Function is defined by: Sensor Logic Actuator Protection Integrity Level And for some functions: Time requirement, for the completion of the Protection Function, from detection to actuation. See MP-related Sensor Systems, MP-related Logic Systems and MP-related Actuation Systems	
Protection Integrity Level (PIL)	Discrete level (from zero to four) specifying the random hardware Failure and systematic Failure requirements related to dangerous modes or Failures of a Protection Function. Protection Integrity Level 0 has the lowest and Protection Integrity Level 4 has the highest requirements related to Protection Function Failures. The Protection Integrity Level requirements relate to the entire Protection Function and is allocated to all of its constituent systems.	
Local Protection Function	A Local Protection Function is a Protection Function where the sensor, logic and actuator chain is contained within the same system. Local Protection Functions are often related to the operation and control of the device or equipment.	
Local Protection System (LPS)	A single or a set of systems that implement Local Protection Functions. A Local Protection System can simultaneously implement part of a Global Protection Function, which means it can also act as an MP-related Sensor System.	

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Global Protection Function	A Global Protection Function is a Protection Function where the sensor, logic and actuator chain is range over multiple systems. Global Protection Functions are often related to Beam Induced Damage and Beam Loss.	
Machine Protection System of Systems (MP- SoS)	The set of all MP-related System s.	
Machine Protection-related System (MP- related System)	Systems that implement part of or complete Protection Functions and Systems that are intended to achieve the necessary Protection Integrity Level of the required Protection Functions .	
MP-related Sensor System	MP-related Sensor Systems implement the sensor part of a Global Protection Function. They measure parameters necessary to detect the presence of a Hazard. Processing of those physical properties and detection of the presence of a Hazard can be part of an MP-related Sensor System.	
MP-related Beam Monitoring System	,	
MP-related Logic System	MP-related Logic Systems implement the logic part of a Global Protection Function. MP-related Logic Systems evaluate information collected from MP-related Sensor Systems. Based on the current operational context of the Machine, they control the MP-related Actuation Systems to achieve and maintain a Protected State.	
MP-related Actuator System	MP-related Actuator Systems implement the actuator part of a Global Protection Function. Systems that are capable of stopping proton beam operation and preventing proton beam generation.	
Higher-Level Operation Critical Systems	Higher-Level Operation Critical Systems are those systems that are essential for operation and that need to work properly before allowing for beam production. Higher-level systems include basic process control systems but also for example the Target Safety Systems and Personnel Safety Systems.	
Beam Interlock System (BIS)	The set of MP-related Logic Systems. The Beam Interlock System evaluates all Beam-Permit signals and controls the MP-related Actuation Systems.	

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Fast Beam Interlock System (FBIS)	The FBIS is part of the Machine Protection System-of-Systems. In essence the FBIS is the final link between the MP-related Actuation Systems and other MP-related systems for MP-related purposes.	
Beam-Permit	A binary signal generated by MP-related Systems, a Beam-Permit signal can have the value OK or NOK (Not OK).	
	An MP-related System sets a Beam-Permit output to the value OK if it does not see any reason to prevent beam (it is healthy and ready for beam production). Otherwise, it sets the Beam-Permit output to the value NOK (Not OK).	
Functional Readiness	The property of a system to be ready for performing its intended function upon demand.	
System Health	Condition of a system indicating whether the system performs within its specifications.	
Interceptive Device	Device that can be move into and extracted from the beam-pi	
Proton Beam Destination	The proton beam can be sent to different destinations: Faraday Cups, Beam Stops, as well as the Tuning Dump and the Target.	
Requested Proton Beam Destination	·	
Configured Proton Beam Destination	The Proton Beam Destination the system is configured for.	
Detected Proton Beam Destination The Proton Beam Destination that is detected (by sensors		
Proton Beam Mode	Information specifying limits for physical beam properties, including beam current, beam pulse length, and pulse repetition rate.	
Requested Proton Beam Mode	The Beam Proton Beam Mode that the operator requests. The Timing System is broadcasting the Requested Proton Beam Destination and Requested Proton Beam Mode to all relevant systems.	
Configured Proton Beam Mode	The Proton Beam Mode the system is configured for.	

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Detected Proton	The Proton Beam Mode that is detected (by sensors).	
Beam Mode		

4. REFERENCES

[1] <<Sample reference to CHESS document: ESS Document (ESS-00XXXXX)>>

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

Revisio n	Reason for and description of change	Author	Date
1	First issue	Christian Hilbes	2017-03-31
2	Updated and adjusted to ESS template	Szandra Kövecses	2017-08-08