Zürcher Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften



School of Engineering

IAMP Institut für Angewandte Mathematik und Physik



ESS FBIS PDR – Project Risks Christian Hilbes - Safety Critical Systems Research Lab - ZHAW



Sent (near Scuol) Switzerland, 29.07.2017 18:15





Main concern: Are we building the right system?

27.07.2017 ESS FBIS PDR - Project Risks - Safety Critical Systems Research Lab ZHAW / hilc

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Are we building the right system?



- (1) FBIS has to support ESS Operation, it should not prevent it.
 - Otherwise "workarounds" will be quickly found, resulting in uncontrolled "unsafe" situations.
- At this time, there is insufficient information on the Concept of Operations for ESS.
 - We work with "Benchmark Use-Cases" that are largely based on assumptions.



- (2) FBIS has to control MP-related Actuation Systems such as to put the facility into a "protected state".
- At this time, there is insufficient dependable information on the functional behavior of those Actuation Systems in the context of Machine Protection.
 - Applies to LEBT- and MEBT-Choppers and Ion-Source Interlock.

Are we building the right system?



- (3) FBIS main role: Implement Logic for Fast Protection Functions.
- At this time, Requirements Specifications for Fast Protection Functions are still being developed.
 - Physical deployment of FBIS depends on sensor locations and redundancy patterns.
 - Challenging ESS availability goals might well force us to go to 2003 architecture patterns.

Are we building the right system?



- Time Schedule is pressing, no more time to wait...
 - Development of FBIS SRS and Architecture based largely on hopefully reasonable assumptions
 - ESS SEMP not fully respected
 - SRS not complete yet → no Functional Review... but we need a PDR now to proceed with the development!
- Risks
 - Requirements Specifications for FBIS might be incomplete
 - FBIS Architecture might not fit ESS needs

Why control systems go wrong and how to prevent failure


From an old source...

HSE – Out of Control

2nd Edition, 2003 (Original 1995)

http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg238.pdf

Risk of Uncomplete Specs...



Root cause of accidents by phase

Operation and

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Installation and

Mitigation from side of ZHAW



- Devise very flexible architectural elements for FBIS
 - Pro: Everything can be done... might be useful anyway, since ESS is a research facility... and things tend to evolve in such an environment...
 - Con: flexibility can be increased through "cleverness" only up to a certain point... after that, complexity will increase...
 - We have to keep the balance and avoid unnecessary complexity!

Requests from ZHAW towards ESS



- (1) FBIS has to support ESS Operation, it should not prevent it.
- ESS should make sure that Operations Responsible check and confirm/update those "Benchmark Use-Case" Assumptions.
 - ESS Operations team in place?



- (2) FBIS has to control MP-related Actuation Systems such as to put the facility into a "protected state".
- ESS should make sure that the LEBT- and MEBT-Chopper and Ion Source get thoroughly tested (!) with respect to their MP-related functions!
 - Actuation and Recovery performance; Interface behavior...
 - Planned on several occasions but never (?) done.

Requests from ZHAW towards ESS



- (3) FBIS main role: Implement Logic for Fast Protection Functions.
- The MP group has set up a perfect process for Protection Function Specification.
 - Identification of Damage Events → Risk Estimation → Tolerable
 Occurrence Magnitude → Overall Protection Function Specification →
 Allocation to Protection Functions and other measures...
- ESS should dedicate adequate resources to the Hazard and Risk Analysis effort to ensure a swift execution of this process!
 - This might not only affect MP group...